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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A N D A R D O P T I C A L 
COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiffs-A p pellant s, 
vs. 
SALT L A K E CITY 
CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
S T A N D A R D O P T I C A L 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
L A W R E N C E A. J O N E S , as Salt 
Lake City Auditor, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
B R I E F OF R E S P O N D E N T 
GIBBONS A N D R E E D COMPANY 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
These were consolidated actions in which the ap-
pellant sought injunctive and declaratory relief and a 
writ of prohibition. They sought to have the creation of 
a special improvement district declared invalid and to 
enjoin further proceedings under it, and to obtain a 
1 
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writ of prohibition to prevent Salt Lake City from mak-
ing any payments under a contract for construction of 
the improvements in the district. 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F L O W E R COURT 
The trial court held that the creation of the special 
improvement district, and the contract let for the im-
provements, were valid. I t dismissed the complaint for 
injunctive and declaratory relief and denied the applica-
tion for a writ of prohibition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Gibbons and Reed Company seeks af-
firmance of the judgment of the trial court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Respondent Gibbons and Reed Company accepts 
as correct the statement of facts as set out in the brief 
of respondent Salt Lake City Corporation and the 
other respondents. 
A R G U M E N T I 
T H E M U N I C I P A L A U T H O R I T I E S P R O P -
E R L Y A W A R D E D T H E M O D I F I E D CON-
TRACT TO GIBBONS A N D R E E D COMPANY. 
2 
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This action was brought by some landowners who 
didn't approve of the Main Street Improvement Pro-
ject. In their zeal to halt the project, they have cam-
paigned for an administrative straight-jacket and 
against equity and common sense. 
Plans and specifications for public contracts to be 
let by competitive bidding must be of sufficient certainty 
and definiteness to enable bidders to reasonably estimate 
their costs of performing the work. Otherwise, unfair 
competition would result, leading to favoritism, fraud, 
corruption, extravagance and increased prices. With 
respect to works of considerable magnitude and com-
plexity, however, details of construction often cannot be 
ascertained with complete accuracy, and reasonable 
modifications are permitted as a matter of necessity: 
"It is a firmly established rule that the author-
ity authorized to let contracts for public works 
or improvements has th? inherent right to make 
reasonable changes o r modifications in such con-
tracts. As many of the decisions indicate, if this 
right was denied, the work contemplated urglit 
become utterly useless because of some unfore-
seen cause," Yoklev, Municipa1 Corporations, 
Vol., 3, p. 20 (1958).* 
In contracts pertaining to construction projects of 
any magnitude, provisions with respect to extra work, 
quantities, and unit prices are customarily included in 
order that items and quantities may be increased or de-
creased as the work progresses. City Street Improve-
ment Co. v. Kroh, 158 Calif. 308, 110 Pac. 933 (1910). 
3 
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By receiving bids on the unit price method municipal 
corporations can properly let complex public projects 
and still maintain the competitiveness required among 
bidders to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest 
practicable price. 
The contract for which bids were received in this 
case was on a unit price basis with special provisions for 
extra work and changes in plans, specifications and 
quantities. All bidders were on notice of such provisions. 
Consequently, adjustments in the contract price could 
easily be determined. Section 1, 1T2, "Eoctra Work'' pro-
vided : 
"An increase in the quantity of any kind of 
work or material on which a unit price is bid in 
the schedule and which does not involve any ma-
terial change in the name or conditions of the 
work, will not be considered as "Extra Work," 
but will be paid for at the unit price as named 
in the schedule. If, however, new, additional, or 
unforeseen work is required which, due to the 
character of the work, operating conditions or lo-
cations do not conform to the specification re-
quirements and unit price upon which bids have 
been received and provided for in the contract, 
when such work or material would be considered 
as "Extra Work," and shall be executed by the 
contractor, in the manner and under the terms 
set forth in a supplemental agreement, which 
may be entered into between the Gity Engineer 
and the Contractor and approved by the Com-
missioner of Streets and Public Improvements 
and the Board of Commissioners. 
"2a. If such agreement is not entered into, then 
4 
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the Contractor shall obtain an "Ex t ra Work Or-
• der," in writing, signed by the City Engineer 
• and approved by the Commissioner above men-
. tioned, describing the work that is required to be 
done and the Contractor will be paid for the same 
on the basis of force account: that is, he si all re-
ceive the actual cost of all material, labor and 
• ; rented equipment furnished by him, as shown by 
. • his paid vouchers, plus fifteen percent (15%) 
provided, however, that the City reserves the 
right to furnish, such materials or equipment as 
it may consider advisaV.e and the contractor shall 
have no claim for profit on the cost of such ma-
terial or equipment. * * *" 
I tem IM o. 20 of" the General . .1 -nuiauons, "Quantities 
and Unit Prices/' provided: 
"The quantities noted in the schedule or pro-
posal are approximations for comparing bids, 
and no claim shall be made against the City for 
excess or deficiency therein, absolute or relative. 
Payment at the unit prices agreed upon will be 
in full for the completed work and will cover all 
materials, supplies, labor, tools, machinery and 
all other expenditures incident to a complete and 
satisfactory compliance with the contract. Any 
item may he increased or entirely eliminated as 
• the interests of the City shall appear," (Empha-
sis added) 
I tem No, KJ, "Changes in Plans, Specifications 
and Quantifies „*" s tated: 
"TAr (tity shall have the right to make any 
changes in the plans, specifications or quantities 
that may hereafter he determined upon as neces-
5 
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sary or desirable either before or after the com-
mencement of the work, by defining them in 
writing, and in case such alterations increase or 
dimmish the approximate quantities as stated in 
the 'Instructions to Bidders/ then the Contrac-
tor shall be paid for the work actually done at the 
contract rates herein specified, and such alter-
ations shall not, under any circumstances be con-
strued as constituting, and shall not constitute 
a claim for damages, nor shall any claim be made 
on account of anticipated profits on the work 
that may be altered or dispensed with." (Em-
phasis added) 
Such contract provisions have been held not to 
render the quantity of work indefinite and not to elim-
inate competition in bidding. In Hensler v. City of 
Los Angeles, 124 C.A.2d 71, 268 P.2d 12 (1954) the 
court commented on the common usage and necessity of 
similar provisions: 
"It is appropriate to observe that in virtually 
every instance, except where lump sum items 
are involved, the contract documents explicitly 
indicate that the quantities of work are approx-
imations. This is a common practice in construc-
tion contracts in order to protect against possible 
miscalculations and to insure the flexibility 
necessary to meet the vicissitudes inherent in this 
type of undertaking. It is perhaps the excep-
tional situation in which the ultimate quantities 
of work done comport neatly with the approxi-
mate figures used for bid purposes/3 P„ 22, 
Hensler involved an action by a contractor for 
breach of a contract calling for installation of runways 
6 
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and taxiways at the Los Angeles International Air-
port. When part of the job site became unavailable the 
city attempted to modify the contract in such a manner 
that the project was left in an unfinished state necessi-
tating the subsequent reletting of some parts of the 
work. The court held that the provisions for changes, 
and for increases or decreases in the project would not 
justify deletion of an integral part of the work so as 
to leave the improvement in an unfinished condition. 
The court explicitly stated, however, that the city was 
authorized to make changes either to achieve "a more 
satisfactory improvement or the elimination of work 
not integrally necessary to the project." P . 19. 
The case of Bent Bros. v. Campbell, 101 Cal. App. 
456, 281 Pac, 717 (1929), well illustrates the right to 
modify a complex construction project without requir-
ing a reletting of the contract. The court stated: 
"While the extent of the work is indicated by 
the plans and specifications, and the amount of 
material to be used in the construction of the pro-
posed dem is set forth, ::;nd the excavations to be 
made described, they are all in the nature of esti-
mates. In other words, the extent of the exca-
vations to be made and the quantity of material 
to be used are approximated only. The kind ojT 
material to be used is particularly described. The 
ptens and specifications were sufficient to notify 
' all patrons of the kind and character of the work 
to be done with an appropriation of the amount 
and extent thereof, and bids were called for on 
a unit prire basis so that each contractor had the 
same opportunity to bid, and the interest of the 
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taxpayer, in having the work performed for the 
least possible expenditure of money, properly 
guarded. The estimated cost of the work in this 
instance was over $800,000. The quantity of 
material runs up into several hundred thousand 
barrels. The circumstances surrounding the work 
and the character of the work itself precluded 
the possibility of fixing an exact price for the 
completed project. W h e r e the unit price is fixed 
for measuring the value of the work done, every 
safeguard of the taxpayer is provided . . . " P . 721. 
A contractual provision authorizing extra work 
and charges was challenged as violating statutes govern-
ing the letting of public contracts in Thomsen-Abbott 
Construction Co. v. City of Wansan, 9 Wis.2d 225, 100 
N .W.2d 921 (1960). I n holding that the provision was 
legally included in a public contract the court stated: 
" [ T ] h e past decisions of this court make it 
clear that changes made after the letting of a 
public contract, which alter the manner of con-
struction but do not substantially change the 
character of the building or unreasonably in-
crease its costs, and are made pursuant to a pro-
vision in the contract permitting such changes, 
legally may be made without pursuing the statu-
tory steps required to be taken before the letting 
of the original contract." P . 925. 
A similar statement is found in Peters v. Ryan 
Construction Corporation, 125 Ind. A p p . 542, 127 N . E . 
2d 242 (1955). There the court held that the municipal 
authority authorized to let a contract for construction 
of sewer installation had the right to make a change in 
8 
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the material used and streets to be paved, and to pay 
for the modification in the manner provided in the or-
iginal contract. The court stated: 
"In this, as in other, jurisdictions it is firmly 
established that the authority authorized to let 
contracts for public works or improvements has 
an inherent right to make reasonable changes or 
modifications in such contracts. As indicated in 
many of the decisions, if this right were denied 
the work contemplated might become utterly 
useless because of some unforeseen cause." P . 
243. 
A provision reserving to the city a right to omit 
any or all of separate items from a contract for the con-
struction of a sewage plant was considered in Best v. 
City of Omaha, 138 Neb. 325, 293 N.W. 116 (1940). 
With respect to provisions reserving the right to alter 
or omit certain items in contracts of construction, the 
court upheld the contract, saying: 
"It is common knowledge that such provisions 
are in many, if not all, contracts for construc-
tion of works of any size. It is obvious that it 
has a legitimate purpose, and that is to enable 
the administrative body to eliminate, if need be, 
unnecessary and auxiliary items, and thereby re-
duce the expense of the construction after the 
cost of the total project is disclosed . . . Cer-
tainly it is sound administrative policy for the 
city to reserve the right to omit such items if for 
reasons of expense or proper construction, etc., 
it is determined best to do so." P . 120. 
In Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 118 
9 
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Utah 552, 223 P.2d 418 (1950) this court indirectly 
referred to the right of the commission to make changes 
in advertised improvements: 
"Respondents assume by this argument that the 
commission does or should do, all its contem-
plating before it advertises for bids and there-
fore, the estimate of the cost of such improve-
ment must be made before that time, and that 
only thereafter a contract may be awarded to 
some bidder if the bid meets all the requirements. 
But there is no such express requirements in the 
statute. I t is conceivable that a commission may 
deliberate anew after advertising for bids and 
decide not to proceed with whatever improve-
ment they had previously contemplated making. 
Under such circumstances it could hardly be 
argued that a bidder would have a right to de-
mand that a contract be awarded. Before an 
actual award of a contract is made, the commis-
sion can continue its contemplating of the desir-
ability of making the improvement . . . " P . 421. 
See also Will v. City of Bismarh 36 N.D. 570, 163 
N.W. 550 (1917); Del Balso Construction Corp. v. 
City of New York, 278 N.Y. 154, 15 N.E.2d 559 
(1938); and Jonathan Clark § Sons Co. v. City of Pitts-
burg, 217 P&. 46,66A. 154 (1907). 
The principles established by these cases and the 
various other courts which have construed provisions 
reserving the power to omit or alter work are summar-
ized in 10 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.) 
§29.64: 
10 
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"Although, generally speaking upon due notice 
and advertisement, specifications may be modi-
fied prior to the time bids are received and open-
ed, notices sent to bidders, changing the specifi-
cations after the bids have been advertised for 
and received, render the contract invalid. Where, 
however, a city reserved the power to omit any 
portion of the work, the exercise of such power 
was not an evasion of the requirement of com-
petitive bidding even though it eliminated profit-
able work from the contract." 
Only a substantial alteration, such as one which 
materially increases the cost of the improvement must 
be awarded pursuant to public bid. Some leeway is 
essential in large, complicated construction projects. 
The situation here is entirely different from that in 
Lassiter and Company v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So. 
14 (1930), cited by appellants, where a contract, after 
being let upon competitive bidding, was subsequently 
modified to provide for an entirely different work at a 
different price without submitting the new contract for 
competitive bids. 
The statute governing contracts made under the 
Municipal Improvement District Act is 10-16-8 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, which provides, in part: 
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, improvements in a special improvement 
district shall be-made onV.under contract duly 
let to the lowest responsible bidder for the kind 
of service or material or form of construction 
which may be determined upon. The improve-
ments may be divided into parts and, separate 
11 
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contracts let for each part or several such parts 
may be combined in the same contract. A con-
tract may be let on a unit basis. If the price bid 
by the lowest and best responsible bidder exceeds 
the estimated, costs as determined by the engineer 
of the municipality, the governing body may 
nevertheless award a contract for the price so 
bid. The governing body may in any case refuse 
to award a contract and may obtain new bids 
after giving a new notice to contractors or may 
determine to abandon the district or not to make 
some of the improvements proposed to be made. 
* * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Competitive bidding statutes do not prohibit the 
making of modifications in public contracts. Under 
the final alternative of the above-quoted statute the gov-
erning body may determine not to make some of the 
proposed improvements. I t is evident that this is pre-
cisely what the City Commission determined to do — 
not to make some of the originally contemplated im-
provements. The trial court found the contract as 
awarded on June 12, 1974, deleted the following items: 
the traffic obelisks, $357,200.00; tree guards, $84,-
136.00; thickset pavers at the intersections, $389,061.45; 
seven-inch concrete underlayment for the pavers, $64,-
700.00; and the storm sewer, $202,534.50. 
The trial determined that minor additions to the 
contract were required for completion of the project. 
These remaining changes were not substantial, and were 
necessitated by elimination of other items. 
12 
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Deletion of the thick-set pavers at the intersection 
necessitated covering the intersection with asphalt pav-
ing, the price of which is included in the contract at a 
unit price. The cost of the asphalt paving is to be paid 
entirely by the city and will not increase the assessment 
against the property owners within the improvement 
district. 
Elimination of the storm sewer required the instal-
lation of shallow drainage system. While appellants 
allege it was necessary for the city to get bids on the 
shallow drainage system this argument must fail in light 
of the exigencies of the situation and the necessity of 
coordinating installation of the drainage system with 
the other work being performed by Gibbons and Reed 
Company. 
Exclusion of the suspended sidewalk system per-
mitted the use of non-reinforced sidewalk pavers which 
were thinner and smaller in dimension. The pre-cast 
concrete pavers were required by the plans and specifi-
cations of the contract to be made by the Schockbeton 
or a comparable process. Both Shocker Construction 
Company and Gibbons and Reed Company had received 
paver subcontract bids from Otto Buehner Company 
of Salt Lake City, the only Shokbeton licensee in Utah 
or Idaho. Otto Buehner Company was the only prac-
ticable supplier of concrete pavers whose price for such 
pavers would have been the same for any prime con-
tractor bidding on the project. 
13 
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The modifications to the contract were proper in 
light of the deletions, inasmuch as they are only inci-
dental to them and were necessitated by the effort to 
bring the contract within the budget. The changes made 
were of the type permitted by the authorities above 
cied. They did not substantially change the basis char-
acter of the project, or increase its costs; they were 
reasonable; they were in fulfillment of the original un-
dertaking; and they did not vary so much from the 
original plan as to constitute a new undertaking. They 
were necessitated by a very real emergency resulting 
from the need to proceed and the rapidly accelerating 
rate of inflation. 
Competitive bidding statutes are enacted for the 
purposes of inviting competition, guarding against fav-
oritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corrup-
tion, and obtaining lowest prices practicable. 10 Mc-
Qtdllin Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.) §29.29; Bohn 
V. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932). 
With respect to the interpretation of bidding stat-
utes the court in Homeowners Construcion Co. v. Bor-
ough of Glen Rock, 34 IST.J. 305, 169 A.2d 129 (1961) 
made the following relevant observation: 
"The statutes must, of course, be faithfully 
observed and any attempt to evade them must be 
stricken down. But they must also be construed 
and applied fairly and sensibly so as to further 
rather than defeat the legislative goals. In the 
course of a construction contract, bona fide em-
ergencies may well arise and incidental altera-
14 
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tions may wdell be required. Where the result-
ing additional expenditures are reasonable and 
are conscientiously viewed as being in fulfill-
ment of the original undertaking rather than as 
departing therefrom it would clearly be contrary 
to the public interest to halt the undertaking and 
call for bidding with respect to the additional 
work entailed by the emergency or the incidental 
alteration. I t may fairly be assumed that such 
course was not within the contemplation of 0it-
Legislature. Similarly it may fairly be assumed 
that the Legislature did not contemplate the halt-
ing of the undertaking pending a further spe-
cific appropriation for the additional work re-
quired by the emergency or the incidental alter-
ation/' (Citations omitted) P . 134. 
When the Main Street contract awarded to Gib-
lions and Reed Company is construed with reference to 
furtherance of the legislative goals there is little doubt 
as to the contract's validity. Re-bidding of the project 
would not have increased competition. It would have 
resulted in higher prices and in construction delays. 
There has been no claim of fraud or dishonesty in 
awarding the contract, and none is justified. I t is not 
even alleged that the contract price was for inure than 
the work is reasonably worth, or that it could he d*inc 
at a reduced cost. Salt Lake City in awarding the con-
tract by scaling down the project and rebidding it did 
so-with the very purpose in mind which forms the basis 
for the competitive bidding statute — attainment of the 
best work and material at the lowest practicable price. 
If the court were to set aside the contract as being made 
15 
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in violation of the competitive bidding statute it would 
frustrate the very intent of that statute. 
Officers vested with the power to let contracts for 
public improvements are given broad discretion in the 
exercise of their duties and court generally will not inter-
fere with their good-faith decisions. 
I n Shulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292, 10 P.2d 
625 (1932) the court affirmed the City's award of a 
contract of nearly $118,000.00 for construction of a 
storm sewer to one bidding $267.36 higher than the 
lowest bidder. After commenting on the discretion af-
forded those officers whose duty it is to award con-
tracts for public improvements the court stated: 
"Courts will not interfere with the decision 
of the city authorities in awarding a contract if 
such decision is founded upon such facts that it 
is not a manifest absue of discretion, is exercised 
jn good faith, is in the best interest of the public 
and is without collusion or fraud, and is not in-
fluenced by motives of personal favoritism or 
ill will. The foregoing rules are supported by 
the great weight of authority. They are founded 
upon sound reasons." P . 628. 
Similarly, in Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 
8 P.2d 591 (1932), Mr. Justice S t a m p , in his concur-
ring opinion, stated that commissioners have sound dis-
cretion in accepting or rejecting bids for proposed pub-
lic works, and matters relating thereto which will not 
be judicially interfered with in the absence of fraud or 
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bad faith, arbitrariness, caprice, or abuse. See also Clay-
ton v. Salt Lake City, 15 I Jtah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93 
(1963). 
In /*///;• v*. Kernan, 148 Or<\ m\. 3(5 P.2.1 580 
(1934) a highway contract h;ul ixvn IH which called 
for the use of Tupper rock for construction. After the 
contractor had commenced work on the project, he 
found that Tupper rock could not be satisfactorily 
crushed and was thereafter permitted to siibstitute 
IJmpqua river gravel, in hohhn^ tin- i-onirn'-t *«» In-
valid, as modified, the Su])reme Com 1 ••" * '•<••_..n .niL 
"While the courts slioul;! zca'ou*•!. maintain 
the right of competitive bidding MI public ii»» 
provement contracts, the statutory restriction 
relative to the award of such contracts should not 
be construed so as to divest the commission of all 
discretion in the matter of alterations or changes 
in plans or specifications. A reasonable degree 
of latitude is essential to an intelligent and effici-
ent administration of public works. See Donnel-
ly on the Law of Public contracts, §142, If the 
rule were otherwise, public interests would be 
greatly jeopardized in the event of emergencies 
and unforeseen obstacles in construction work, 
" * * *" P . 584, ' 
The principles of law established by these cases are 
in complete accord with the prevailing view throughout 
the country. I n 10 McQwllin Municipal Corporations 
(3rd Ed . ) §29.83, it is stated: 
' 'Although, under appropriate forms and 
methods of procedure hereinafter considered, the 
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courts may review the action of city officials in 
awarding a contract, in the absence of fraud, 
corruption or abuse of discretion, the determina-
tion of the proper officers in making an award 
will not be disturbed by the courts. Thus while 
it is the court's duty to determine whether or not 
municipal officials have exercised their discretion 
in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable man-
ner, and to determine the soundness of allegations 
of fraud, collusion, or misconduct, a court will not 
attempt to control the municipal discretion nor 
substitute its judgment for that of the muni-
cipal officials." 
The municipal officers in the instant case did not 
act in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner, 
and were not guilty of fraud, collusion or misconduct. 
Because the bids exceeded the engineer's estimate of 
$2,875,189.00 (which had been publicized as the maxi-
mum amount of the contract), the City was faced with 
some difficult choices: (1) to accept the low bid as 
submitted, thus increasing the cost to the property 
owners; (2) to reject all bids and re-advertise with 
modified specifications, which would increase the costs 
because of the inflationary rate in the construction in-
dustry; (3) to abandon the project; or (4) to make 
deletions, and minor changes incidental to them, within 
the framework of the contract as originally bid. 
Appellants contend that the City should have 
adopted the second alternative in order to comply with 
the requirements of the competitive bidding statutes. 
However, as discussed in Point I, awarding the con-
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tract as modified to G ibbons and Reed Company did 
not violate the mandates of competitive bidding. In 
making the contractual alterations, the City and Gib-
bons and Reed Company acted in good faith and reason-
able under the circumstances. I t is inconceivable in this 
period of high inflationary trends in the construction 
industry that a city should be required to ^--advertise 
a contract when it can accomplish its purpose by delet-
iiig materials from the contraci as bid. Such a pro-
cedure would lead to an endless circle of advertising, 
rejection and re-advertising and would result in delay 
and increased costs, results clearly not in the public 
interest. 
There is an additional reason the City determined 
to implement the work originally intended within the 
framework of the first contract rather than to reject 
all bids and re-advertise with modified specifications. 
To hold invalid the contract with Gibbons and Reed 
Company would seriously interfere with the future abil-
ity of the City to find contractors willing to go to the 
time and expense necessary to prepare bids and enter 
into contracts for public works. Had Gibbons and Reed 
Company failed to enter into the contract presented it, 
iu I iid I Hind rould have been forfeited. The mere fact 
that changes had been made subsequent to the bid would 
not relieve Gibbons and Reed from the forfeiture clause 
respecting the bond. In City, of Crocket v. Murdoch, 
440 S.W. 2d 864 (Tex. 1969) a contractor brought an 
action against the city to ivco\cr a bid deposit. The 
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contractor based his refusal to perform the contract on 
the ground that the issuance of an addendum to the 
contract, of which he had no knowledge when making 
his hid, was a material change in the drawings and speci-
fications relieving him of his default. The court held 
the addendum did not constitute a material change 
which would permit the contractor to recover his de-
posit in lieu of bid bond. The court stated: 
"We recognize that the generally accepted rule 
is that where a statute requires that a contract 
for public works shall be let to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder, municipal corporations or ad-
ministrative agencies cannot evade the law by 
making a substantial change in the contract after 
it had been awarded pursuant to the law. If the 
deviations from a contract awarded for the con-
struction of a public work vary so substantially 
from the original plan as to constitute a new un-
dertaking, the contract could be let only by com-
petitive bidding. However, in order to render the 
contract void because of the changes or devia-
tions the same must be substantial." (Emphasis 
added) P . 867. 
The Municipal Improvement District Act bars 
judicial relief of issues that do not go to the equity, 
justice or basic jurisdiction of decisions made by the 
city commission relating to special improvement dis-
tricts. Section 10-16-28(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
states: 
"No "court shall entertain . . . any complaint 
that does not go to the equity or justice of the 
assessment or proceeding." 
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Errors or irregularities in ih<- manner of awarding the 
control, if any, e.g., deletion of <mnc of the quantities 
and specified line items, did not to the substance of the 
contract and did not go to the equity or Jus t in of Hie 
proceeding. 
C O N r T I'M ION .. , ..' . . .., 
sail Lake ( i ly solicited and received competitive 
bids for construction of the Main Street Improvement 
Project . Because the bids were in excess of funds allo-
cated for the project certain deletions and modifica-
tions within the general scope of the contract were made. 
Because the bids were on a unit basis. I he ciiy was able 
to determine ^iu.i? mu mveinents lo make and which 
to delete from the contract and still ascertain the lowest 
responsible bidder. These alterations were made under 
reservations in the contract expressly providing there-
for, and were not of such character as to require re-
advertisement for bids. 
T!-<- *'it eceived the i'n i h; nch; of competitive 
bidding, the contract did noi Iia\e a ieudency to stifle 
competition and there was no attempt to evade the law. 
I n addition, the contract was not against public policy 
and avoided delay and increased costs incidental to a 
call for new bids. \- *- - L<--'~-: _ -
there KJ another motive to uphold the validity of 
the contract awarded to Gibbons and Reed Company. 
W h e n faced with a contract such as this, a contractor 
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is put in a delicate position. I t has to decide whether it 
will or will not perform a contract awarded to it in 
response to its bid. If it performs, and the contract is 
held invalid, it may be deprived of the compensation to 
which it would otherwise be entitled; if it refuses to per-
form, and the award was valid, it may be subjected to 
penalties such as the forfeiture of its bid bond, or to 
damages for breach of contract. 
For these reasons, municipal authorities must be 
given some discretion with respect to the making of 
awards, the adjustment of contract quantities, changes 
in plans and specifications. This is recognized by the 
cases which generally hold that the exercise of discretion 
by the municipal authorities will be upheld in the ab-
sence of fraud, bad faith, or the like. Nothing of that 
kind is present here. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE A N D F O W L E R 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Gibbons and Reed Company 
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